

overcoming issues, especially when they allow us time to adapt. However, there's no promise that any future issues will do that, and while a one-size fits all policy answer is unlikely to exist, without determined, focused, and prompt action human innovation has no chance against climate change or other future problems. Galor does offer a few general ideas for the policy implications of his work, but he does not go into much detail in offering concrete tools to counter the root-of-it-all issues he proposes. On a general level, gender equality, education, and public health are identified as routes to improved human capital, which reads as the source of much of Galor's optimism. By providing all people the living conditions, nutrition, and education needed to foster human capital, we can make use of the variety of competencies and skills that precede future progress for the human race.

Behind the ambitious goal of constructing a comprehensive framework spanning the lifetime of humanity lies an even bigger one: popularising science. The idea that this book can be a gateway opus into the scientific sphere, while possibly excessive, might not be fully misguided. The book, starting even with its structure and layer-by-layer-explanations, is generally welcoming and accessible to a wide audience. Galor largely succeeds in expressing his ideas exactly and factually while avoiding overly complicated terms, phrases, and reasoning. Where he talks in terms of scientific concepts, he deciphers them with easily understood and simplified explanations without losing too much informative power. Even though his focus remains on the big picture, throughout the book Galor offers descriptive examples, similes, metaphors, and short stories to illustrate his ideas. Whether bringing up the effect of the Black Death on population size or demonstrating the differences between periods by telling the stories of three fictional families, the author relies on mostly

well-known and approachable analogies in the hope of conveying his message to a larger audience. Fundamental theories and authors, especially in the field of economics, are introduced throughout the book, and the requirements of prior knowledge to enjoy the book are minimal. In some parts of the book, this does result in language that bears a resemblance to that of a university textbook, but the content remains beyond that.

When it comes to the factual knowledge and the arguments explored in the book, more scholarly readers might take notes to dig deeper through other venues, but they should still find the book informative. In sum, this book is likely to provide insight into how to communicate complex scientific ideas accessibly and to enable science to reach a larger audience.

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Juliana Bidadanure: *Justice Across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals*

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Intergenerational justice has become a topic of great empirical and policy concern in ageing societies [Vanhuyse 2013, 2014]. In this book, Juliana Bidadanure adds to this literature by building a theory of justice across ages by combining the ideas of complete life equality, lifespan prudence, and relational egalitarianism. The argument that inequalities between ages do not matter as long they are compatible with lifespan equality is used here as a sparring partner for a theory of justice that argues why unequal or differential treatment between ages matters and under what circumstances it is justified or even prudent. The first four chapters contain the building

blocks for Bidadanure's theory, and the last three chapters apply the principles to different policy proposals. The introduction outlines the main elements of her theory. The first element, birth cohort equality, only looks at equality over the complete lifespan. The second element, lifespan prudence, posits that there is a case for distributing resources over the life course in a way that is sufficient at all ages, is efficient, and allows for differential treatment of age groups. The third element, relational egalitarianism, goes beyond distribution and posits that people should be able to relate to each other as equals, free of domination, regardless of their age.

Chapter one starts by defining age as a social category and how it performs in the context of discrimination compared to race and gender. The main difference is the temporal nature of age. Unlike race and gender, people do not stay at the same age. Age discrimination could therefore be temporary and potentially compatible with equal treatment over time. The bigger part of the chapter then deals with the difference between 'complete lives' and 'simultaneous segments' egalitarianism, the theoretical background behind the complete lives approach, and the connection to luck egalitarianism. Lastly, Bidadanure highlights the importance of picking the appropriate currency for egalitarian theories.

Chapter two presents Norman Daniels' 'prudential lifespan approach' (PLA). According to Daniels' PLA, inequalities between ages are justified when they are not in conflict with complete lives equality, and when they have positive effects for everyone. This PLA works with the assumption that age inequalities are only residual interpersonal inequalities and with the assumption that planners make decisions behind a veil of ignorance. In the remainder of the chapter, Bidadanure draws two main principles out of the PLA and entertains some objections to it. First, the principle of lifespan sufficiency, which dictates two

thresholds. The absolute threshold is an 'appeal to basic human needs and freedom from deprivation', and the second threshold is 'set at the level of what counts as a reasonable array of plans for a given age group in a given society at a given time' (p. 60). Second, lifespan efficiency posits that resources and opportunities should be provided in a way that improves 'diachronic utility' (p. 63). This means that resources and opportunities can yield a greater return over the lifetime when they are available earlier rather than later. Finally, Bidadanure shows that this PLA can be criticised on the grounds of lifespan inequality, demographic change, anti-paternalism, and intersectional inequalities.

In chapter three, Bidadanure engages in more detail with Dennis McKerlie's 'simultaneous segments egalitarianism' (SSE) that argues 'that temporal segments have significance in and of themselves for distributive purposes' (p. 89). She argues that this approach has an arbitrariness problem, as it is not clear how big the relevant time segments are. Bidadanure then posits that relational egalitarianism is the better approach to explain why inequalities between age groups can be problematic, as they can also carry their own moral weight. This approach deals with the relationships between people and asks the question whether they can stand as equals regardless of age. One obstacle to that goal is formed by stark hierarchies or other synchronic relational inequalities. In chapter four, Bidadanure summarises the principles of her theory, and then highlights some potential internal conflicts. The chapter also tests some examples on the three principles – for example, environmental risks like climate change can affect birth cohort equality as the consequences will grow worse over time. Lastly, Bidadanure outlines what her principles mean in the sense of treating the young as equals. In the case of lifespan efficiency, she points towards pre-distributive poli-

cies, such as investments into children and young adults.

In chapter five Bidadanure discusses a youth guarantee to address the labour market vulnerability of young people and prevent scarring effects, especially in relation to lifespan efficiency. She further discusses the idea of mandatory retirement, which is largely based on a conception of the labour market as a zero-sum game, and concludes that it is both imprudent and morally questionable. Bidadanure also poses the question whether a youth guarantee can be reinterpreted as a duty to work and warns that this idea is based on an erroneous conception of reciprocity and that it ignores important non-market care and social work. Lastly, she addresses the problem of ageism and shows the difficulties involved in defining demeaning treatment. Chapter six discusses Universal Basic Income (UBI) and Basic Capital (BC), a lump-sum grant. Bidadanure argues that while UBI is better equipped for sufficiency, BC can have advantages in efficiency. BC might have some advantages in terms of reducing lifespan inequalities, but UBI is better suited to address inequality between birth cohorts. Furthermore, UBI has advantages in terms of synchronic relational equality, by offering (young) people an exit option out of relationships of domination. To harness the benefits from both, Bidadanure offers a hybrid solution that combines the two.

In her last chapter, Bidadanure exercises the example of youth quotas. Referring to the de-jure and de-facto exclusion of youth from political power, she argues that including more young politicians, increasing experiential diversity, could widen the policy options in party platforms. Furthermore, this descriptive presentation of youth could 'increase innovation in problem solving' and lead to 'fiercer advocacy' (p. 221). Finally, Bidadanure argues that the underrepresentation of youth undermines their status as political equals and

can act as a repellent to their political participation.

Bidadanure does excellent theoretical work; however, there are some points worthy of further discussion. The first one is the distinction between choice, referring to the individual's deliberate decisions, and circumstance. According to Bidadanure, it is this clear moral separation in luck egalitarianism that leads proponents of that theory to be potential advocates of complete lives equality. Equalising resources at any given time would violate the most important principle of luck egalitarianism, which is that only those inequalities that are based on luck, and are not your responsibility, need to be corrected. Luck egalitarianism would therefore not be compatible with simultaneous segments egalitarianism. While Bidadanure accurately argues that choice and circumstances are morally separated in luck egalitarianism, it remains unclear in her egalitarian theory, how one should separate the two, and furthermore, how to treat either. However, Bidadanure does not ignore the problem. Rather, she acknowledges the difficulties, but does not come to a clear conclusion. This becomes evident in several examples.

The first example is that of low voter turnouts in the younger age groups. In the beginning of her book, she lists several examples that justify the exploration of age inequalities as a relevant issue. The lower youth voter turnout sticks out as the only one that uses active language: 'young adults typically vote at much lower rates' (p. 2). Later, she argues that this can be due to a 'disenchantment with politics' (p. 35), adopting a more passive tone. We now see that the responsibility for this situation is not as clear as first assumed. Finally, as part of the defence of youth quotas, Bidadanure argues that lower youth voter turnout can also be caused by obstacles stemming from their more frequent relocation, but also stigmatisation, suppression of information, and lack of democratic ed-

ucation. We can see, therefore, that for actions such as voting, the distinction between choice and circumstance is not so clear. And yet, this distinction has to play a role in every theory of justice.

A second example is represented by the discussions around longevity groups, paternalism, as well as Universal Basic Income and Basic Capital. As not everyone has the chance of living a full life of normal length, there are some people who will die younger and miss out on the benefits that are distributed, according to lifespan sufficiency, towards the end of the lifespan. One response to this could be to distribute much more to the younger ages, potentially increasing lifespan efficiency. This is also presented as one of the main advantages of Basic Capital over UBI. Bidanure is sceptical of this solution for several reasons. First, not everybody will use the larger share of resources in a wise way, incurring the risk of aggravating existing inequalities. Second, how do we deal with those who have lost their resources and are now at risk of falling below one or two of the thresholds outlined in her principle of lifespan sufficiency? Clearly, we cannot let them starve. At least, that is the answer given in *Justice Across Ages*, and with it, Bidanure distances her theory from basic luck egalitarianism. These examples, however, do not give us a good idea as to how we should treat personal responsibility and choice. Bidanure then offers one additional distinction, separating circumstances into accidental or social causes, but unfortunately does not explain this in any detail. The problem with all these distinctions is how to find a clear moral distinction, but beyond that there is also a major epistemic challenge: How do you collect and understand that much data to know how a particular action came to be? Bidanure wisely decided not to choose the easy way out and equate actions with choice, but she also cannot bring us much closer to solving this conundrum.

A promising point, however, in Bidanure's account is the inclusion of the intersectionality of social risks. She argues that her focus on age-group justice can also address matters of justice along other social categories such as gender, race, and class. While the vulnerabilities of an age group can be spread very unevenly across that age group, policies of sufficiency can be helpful, because 'aged-based vulnerabilities threaten sufficiency for groups who are socially disadvantaged' (p. 80). Policies of efficiency, such as free education and financial support for all students, can also prevent the clustering of disadvantages. Following Bidanure's logic, one could then imagine that policies to reduce class inequalities, such as more progressive tax systems, collective bargaining agreements, and generous unemployment benefits can alleviate the challenges of lifespan sufficiency. Bidanure's account could profit from including this reversed perspective more clearly. Note also that the scope of the analysis matters more than the author seems to acknowledge. Frequently corroborated conclusions about elderly age-group bias in public policy, while true on their own, are actually reverted once private transfers of cash and time by families are taken into account. Welfare states are lifecycle redistribution machines: they redistribute much more between age groups than between status groups [Vanhuysse et al. 2021]. More specifically, we live in pro-elderly welfare states, embedded within *child-oriented* societies [Gal, Vanhuysse and Vargha 2018].

Of special relevance for concerns of public policy also is Bidanure's principle of lifespan efficiency. Her application of this principle to public policy leads to recommendations of public investments in early childhood and of policies addressing the labour market vulnerabilities of younger adults, such as education, training, and employment. Taking into account also her endorsement of guaranteed-income poli-

cies, this policy package shares very much resembles that featured in different works by the Danish sociologist Esping-Andersen. As a response to the advent of new social risks and to promote a sustainability society, Esping-Andersen [2002] proposed a combination of social investment policies such as labour market activation, lifelong learning, child benefits, free day care, and income guarantees. Both accounts share the goal of efficiency, increasing future returns and preventing social exclusion.

In sum, in *Justice Across Ages* Juliana Bidadanure offers a very detailed and thorough account of age-group justice and its implications for public policy. Her theoretical account, already presented in earlier work, is now much more refined and rigorous. The strength in her account lies also in its encompassing nature, addressing both age-group and cohort justice, in offering a robust egalitarian take on age inequalities, and in its openness to intersectional concerns related to other important social categories such as race, class, and gender. Her account could still benefit, however, from a clearer stance on the question of individual responsibility and a further elaboration of intersectionality.

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- Katie Martin: *Evolving Education: Shifting to a Learner-Centered Paradigm***
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'As much as we want grades to reflect what students know and do, they often communicate what teachers value and how well students can comply with those rules' (p. 90). The above quote highlights what this book is about: changing teaching from being school-oriented to learner-oriented. The author emphasises that it is time to create a new normal to pursue learner-oriented teaching by building a fundament on connection, flexibility, purpose, agency, relationships, and authentic learning. For our author this is how the future of education should be, as it helps the education system to evolve, rather than remain stagnant. Changing the system to become more learner-oriented, the author claims, will help students to develop the skills that empower them to grow, solve problems, and learn. When they have these skills, students can proceed to study any subject and to learn and solve problems on their own, as these skills are fundamental for everyone and for every course a student may study.

The book is divided into three sections, each of which has a question as its heading. This question is answered through different chapters, each of which challenges us to continually ask ourselves to redefine what success looks like in the education system. The author asks us to adopt a broader understanding of the term success and how